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THE ESCALATION OF EVIL: A STUDY
IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF JUVENILE
LAW
By JOHN HAGAN AND ALIXE ARDEN COLLINS*
The behaviour of law is social.' By this we mean that the law takes form
in the observable acts of groups and individuals, and that this behaviour has
social origins and consequences. This social dimension to legal behaviour is
particularly pronounced in the area of juvenile law. In part, this derives from
the intent of the juvenile law to provide reformative treatment rather than to
assign criminal responsibility.2 While it is difficult to quarrel with the desire
to provide such treatment, concerns frequently are expressed about actions
taken by the court in the name of this goal.
One concern is that from the beginning, Canada's juvenile delinquency
legislation has justified its procedural means on the basis of its reform-oriented
ends. 3 The original legislation of 1908 instructed that, "This Act shall be
liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out to wit: That
the care and custody and discipline of a juvenile delinquent shall approximate
as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents.... ."4 This
paternal attitude was questioned in the Commons5 and Senate" Debates that
accompanied passage of the 1908 Act, in consequent discussions of the revised
Act of 1929,7 and most recently in the Report of the Solicitor General's
Committee on new legislation to replace the Juvenile Delinquents Act.8 Sum-
marizing persistent concerns about the traditional legal approach to the prob-
lem of delinquency in Canada, the Report observes that "while espousing
help, and understanding of the problems experienced by young persons, this
approach has not totally avoided the development of characteristics similar
0 Copyright, 1978, J. Hagan and A .A. Collins.
* Mr. Hagan is Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto. Ms. Collins
is a recent graduate student at the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, and
received her Master's degree this spring.
1 See D. Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
2 R. Ericson, Responsibility, Moral Relativity, and Response Ability: Some Implica-
tions of Deviance Theory for Criminal Justice (1975), 25 U. of T. LJ. 23.
3 For historical discussions of Canadian delinquency legislation, see J. Hagan and
J. Leon, Rediscovering Delinquency: Social History, Political Ideology and the Sociology
of Law (1977), 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 587; and J. Leon, The Development of Canadian
Juvenile Justice: A Background for Reform (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall LJ. 71.
4 The Juvenile Delinquents Act, 1908, Stat. Can., 7 & 8 Edw. 8, c. 40, s. 31.
G Can: H. of C. Debates, Jul. 9, 1908, at 12403-05.
6 Can: Sen. Debates, June 4, 1908, at 1044.
7 1929, Stat. Can., 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 3(2).8 Can. Report of the Solicitor General's Committee on Proposals for New Legisla-
tion to Replace the Juvenile Delinquent Act (Young Persons in Conflict with the Law)
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
to the adult criminal process ... elements such as deterrence, punishment,
detention and the resulting stigma have surfaced in the juvenile justice process
despite initial intentions to the contrary."9
Yet, one may question how the above is known with any degree of cer-
tainty. The 1965 Report of the Department of Justice Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency concludes that "... little is known in this country concerning
the effectiveness of the many and varied techniques that are employed to meet
the delinquency problem."'10 Similarly, another recent discussion laments that
".... no comprehensive evaluation of the court's operation throughout Canada
has been undertaken."" More generally, Martin Friedland recently has noted
that our judicial system is one of the least studied of Canadian institutions.12
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical basis for the current
debate about our juvenile justice system by analysing data gathered on its
judicial component in one Canadian city. We begin by reviewing the theoreti-
cal and research literature relevant to this topic. Much of this literature is
American and some of it deals with the criminal courts. Nonetheless, its signi-
ficance to the topic of Canadian juvenile justice will quickly become apparent.
Our review is organized in terms of three theoretical approaches taken in the
study of law and judicial decision-making.
18
A. The Legal-Consensus Approach
A traditional view of law is that it derives from custom, and therefore
expresses values that we all share in common. Thus, Paul Bohannan asserts
that "some customs, in some societies, are reinstitutionalized at another level:
they are restated for the more precise purposes of legal institutions."' 4 Bohan-
nan regards this process of "secondary institutionalization" as relatively non-
problematic in that it forms "a more or less consistent cultural unit.," 5 In
other words, laws, and decisions based on them, are assumed to flow in a
rather clear and consistent manner from the culture that surrounds them.
This theme of clarity and consistency is paralleled in the work of Lon
Fuller, who argues that certainty and predictability are the highest values of
a legal order.16 Thus Fuller defines law as ". . . the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules."'lr What binds men together in
lawful conduct, according to Fuller, is the desire that these rules be formally
9 Id. at 3.
10 Can. Report of the Department of Justice Committee on Juvenile Delinquency
(Juvenile Delinquency in Canada) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965) at 273.
" See Leon, supra note 3, at 105.
12 M. Friedland, Courts and Trials (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
1' For a more general discussion of the first two theoretical approaches that we will
consider, see W. Chambliss and R. Seidman, Law, Order and Power (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1971).
14 p. Bohannan, The Differing Realms of Law (1965), 67 Am. Anthropologist 33.
'G Id. at 51.
16L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
17 Id. at 91.
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applicable in a predictable manner. For Fuller, it is this shared goal that
determines the character and content of the "inner morality of law."
What unites the thinking of Bohannan and Fuller is the assumption that
the law and its application flows from shared values. Although Fuller is fur-
ther concerned with the conditions that may undermine shared conceptions of
legality, he nonetheless assumes that proper conditions insure legality, and,
therefore, the straightforward application of laws. 18
Various researchers have attempted to demonstrate that the application
of law in the juvenile and criminal courts is ruleful, expressive of common
values, and therefore free of extra-legal biases. For example, Edward Green
examined the records of 333 adult defendants who were sentenced for crimes
of theft, burglary and robbery from 1956 to 1957.29 Green concludes from
the analysis of this data that judicial decisions are not capricious, but rather
based on legal criteria: ". . . the results provide assurance that the delibera-
tions of the sentencing judge are not at the mercy of his passions or prejudices,
but comply with the mandate of law."
20
Using a similar strategy of analysis, Terry examined the 246 cases that
appeared in the Juvenile Court of Racine, Wisconsin (n-246) between 1958
and 1962.21 In this study, Terry finds that type of offence and previous record
have a persistent impact on the decision-making process, implying that juve-
niles are processed in a rather "legalistic" manner.
Finally, Lawrence Cohen has analysed the record of the 4,938 juveniles
who were referred to the Denver Juvenile Court between January and Decem-
ber, 1972.22 This research again finds that severity of disposition is most
strongly associated with the legal variables just discussed. Nonetheless, and
despite the support given the legal-consensus theorists by the research of
Cohen, Terry and Green, there is a second theoretical approach that takes
almost the opposite point of view.
B. The Conflict-Realist Approach
While the legal-consensus theorists assume that the law and its application
expresses with certainty and predictability the values that all of us share in
common, the conflict-realist theorists argue that the law and particularly its
application reflects the value differences that divide us. Here there is less cer-
tainty and predictability than there is conflict and change. Oliver Wendell
Holmes succinctly summarized an early version of this viewpoint with his fre-
quently cited conclusion that "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
18 Id. at 39.
19 E. Green, Judicial Attitudes in Sentencing (London: Macmillan, 1961).
20 1d. at 102.
21 R. Terry, Discrimination in the Handling of Juvenile Offenders by Social Control
Agencies (1967), 4 J. of Research in Crime & Delinquency 218.
22 L. Cohen, Conferring the Delinquent Label: the Relative Importance of Social
Characteristics and Legal Factors in the Processing of Juvenile Offenders (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1974).
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been experience. '23 Holmes "felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy . . . , even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. '24
Similarly, Karl Llewellyn wrote persistently of the need, for the purposes
of study, to separate the "law in the books" from the "law in action. '2 This
separation of the law as it is written from the law as it is applied is funda-
mental to recent developments in the sociology of law. For example, Chambliss
and Seidman reintroduce this distinction in sociological terms when they speak
of comparisons between role-expectations and role-performances in studying
the activities of official agents of social and legal control.20
Thus, like the legal realists, the sociological conflict theorists have sought
to determine how legal behaviour varies from legal ideals, and furthermore to
reveal what the social bases of these disparities might be. Among the social
factors thought to be particularly influential in the application of law, the
conflict theorists single out the elements of race and social class for particular
attention. Thus, as a fundamental proposition of their theory, Chambliss and
Seidman assert that "when sanctions are imposed, the most severe sanctions
will be imposed on persons in the lowest social class."127 Similarly, Quinney
suggests that "Obviously judicial decisions ... are made according to a host
of extra-legal factors, including the age of the offender, his race, and social
class." 28 These assertions take as their base a research literature that shares
the doubts of legal realists about "the rule of law" in criminal and juvenile
justice operations.
Although there are many studies of the criminal courts that form a part
of this tradition,29 the most dramatic is an analysis of Wolfgang and Reidel of
3,000 rape cases tried in eleven southern American states from 1945 to 1965.80
This study reveals that during the period considered, black men raping white
women were primary targets for the death penalty, while white men raping
black women almost never received this sanction. Less dramatic, but no less
disconcerting, are related findings in the area of juvenile justice.
The first of these studies was done by Charles Thomas, who collected
data from juvenile court records of 1,522 cases appearing in one area of Vir-
ginia between 1966 and 1973.31 Thomas correlated the socio-economic status




5 K. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound (1931),
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222.
26 Supra note 13, at 11.
2 7 Id. at 475.
2 8 R. Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).
29 For a review of this research, see J. Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal
Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint (1974), 8 Law & Society Rev. 357.
30 M. Wolfgang et a]., Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty (1973),
407 Annals 119.
31 C. Thomas et al., An Inquiry into the Association between Respondents' Personal
Characteristics and Juvenile Court Dispositions (1975), 17 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 61.
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and case dispositions of juveniles and found those lowest in status were most
likely to be placed in institutions. Furthermore, when offence type was taken
into account, the linkage of socio-economic status with disposition remained
unaltered. Finally, Thomas found that children from "broken homes" were
treated more harshly than those from "stable" home environments.
A second study is reported by Terence Thomberry on the Philadelphia
juvenile justice system,32 using a cohort sample of 1,748 juvenile males.
33
Thornberry finds evidence of racial differences in sentencing, again with legal
variables taken into account: ".... the data reveal that blacks are treated more
severely than whites throughout the juvenile justice system. At the levels of
the police and juvenile court there are no deviations from this finding, even
when the seriousness of the offense and the number of previous offenses are
simultaneously held constant.134 Thornberry's findings with respect to socio-
economic status are similar to those for race.
A third study, by Scarpatti and Stephenson, is based on 1,210 adjudi-
cated delinquents.35 The results of this analysis reveal that judges consider
prior delinquent history, socio-economic status and personality characteristics
in assigning specific dispositions.3 6
Finally, William Arnold has examined the juvenile court records of 758
offenders who were born between 1947 and 1948 in a southern city and who
had committed offences prior to April, 196437 According to the findings of
this research, low socio-economic status and "broken home" environments
do not seem to influence juvenile court dispositions, while race and ethnicity do.
Findings reviewed in this section indicate that the related variables of
race and socio-economic status influence decisions of the juvenile court, sug-
gesting support for the conflict-realist view of court operations. Alternatively,
studies reviewed in the previous section provided support for the legal-con-
sensus view that decision-making in the criminal and juvenile courts is ruleful,
and therefore predictable from official case characteristics. What is required,
evidently, is a theoretical viewpoint that makes sense of these contrasting
bodies of research. First, however, we must consider a third approach that
questions both of the preceding viewpoints.
C. The Phenomenological Approach
As indicated at the outset of this paper, the founding fathers of Canada's
juvenile court wished to give its practitioners maximum discretion in their
3 2 T. Thornberry, Race, Socio-economic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice
System (1973), 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 90.
83 This sample was collected for the purpose of another study by M. Wolfgang
et al., Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).
34 Supra note 32, at 96.
35 F. Scarpatti et al., Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making
Process (1971), 17 Crime & Delinquency 142.
301d. at 151.
37 W. Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile Court Dis-
positions (1971), 17 Am. J. Soc. 211.
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handling of adolescents. Hogarth has noted that in Canada, criminal court
judges as well have great freedom, particularly in fixing sentences. 8 The
result of this situation, according to Hogarth, is that sentencing is a highly
subjective or "phenomenological" process. Using data gathered on the sen-
tencing decisions of Ontario judges, Hogarth concludes that neither the objec-
tive case characteristics emphasized by the legal consensus theorists, nor the
objective (but extra-legal) offender characteristics emphasized by the conflict-
realist theorists, have a pronounced impact on judges' sentencing decisions.
Rather, Hogarth argues that it is the way individual judges perceive these
facts that makes the difference. Thus Hogarth finds that "on average, the facts
of the cases account for 9 per cent of the variation in [sentencing] practice," 80
while "... about 50 per cent of the total variation in length of institutional
sentences imposed could be accounted for by variations among magistrates in
their perceptions of the facts of the cases."
40
The implication of Hogarth's research is that sentencing is predominantly
an individualized process, a process that is largely independent of the facts at
hand. It is research of this type that leads the eminent jurist Marvin Frankel
to believe that "the evidence is conclusive that judges of widely varying atti-
tudes on sentencing, administering statutes that confer huge measures of dis-
cretion, mete out widely divergent sentences where the divergences are ex-
plainable only by the variations among the judges, not by material differences
in the defendants or their crimes."
41
In the remainder of this paper, we will present theory and data in support
of the position that sentencing is not so individualized a process, but rather
subject to a predictable form of social and legal organization.
D. The Social and Legal Organization of Juvenile Justice
The theoretical perspective to be applied in this paper begins with the
obvious fact that juvenile courts are organizations. Thus, the behaviour of
juvenile law takes form within a context characterized by organizational goals
and priorities. One task of persons working within the juvenile courts, then,
is to coordinate the substantive and procedural law with the day to day goals
and priorities of the organization that surrounds them.
This organizational task is facilitated by the flexible character of juvenile
court legislation. Yet, juvenile court judges do not respond to this legislation
by individualizing every decision they make. Rather, the response is to look
for decision-making cues which judges in common recognize as demanding a
particular type of response. The ideal cues to be used in this way combine an
element of moral and legal judgment.
Thus, two legal history variables, the age of first arrest and the most
38 J. Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1971).
89 Id. at 349.
40 Id. at 350.
41 M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (New York: Hill and Wang,
1973) at 21.
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serious prior disposition against the offender, represent cues that can be
consensually identified by members of the court as calling for a particular
type of response. Tannenbaum recognized the potential consequences that the
first arrest and disposition can have, referring to this early set of events as
"the dramatization of evil": "The first dramatization of the 'evil' which sepa-
rates the child out of his group for specialized treatment plays a greater role
in making the criminal than perhaps any other experience." 42 Tannenbaum's
concern is that "there is a gradual shift from the definition of the specific acts
as evil to a definition of the individual as evil ... ." Yet, for judges to ignore
previous arrests and dispositions would amount to a rejection of actions al-
ready taken by colleagues and subordinates. On the other hand, responding
regularly and predictably to these cues in judicial decision-making is precisely
the way in which the dramatization of evil proceeds. Thus, it is our argument
that the cumulative impact of these variables over time can amount to an
"escalation of evil" which is viewed with sufficient moral and legal consensus
to regularly yield severe dispositions.
However, evil is not only recognized in an adolescent's legal history, but
in his social history as well. The juvenile court is mandated by legislation to
play a paternal role in the life of the adolescent, and this is done in part by
reacting to the family situation of the youth. Thus, I J. Kelso, the father of
Canada's delinquency legislation, noted that "Prevention-that is, the pre-
vention which purifies the home life and restores maternal care and affection,
is the very highest form of child-saving work, and the ideal toward which all
efforts should tend. ' 43 It is here, however, that value conflict is most likely
to intrude into the work of the court. The problem is in determining what
kinds of family life are "good" and "bad" for children. Typically, the legal
status of the parents as divorced or separated offers a base from which such
moral judgments proceed. Even more problematic, however, is the decision
as to which "broken homes" are morally most reprehensible, and therefore
candidates for removal of the child. Most often, it is the broken home in a
low income neighbourhood that in a common sense manner is collectively
identified by members of the court as likely to intensify the "escalation of
evil" discussed above. Again, this collective definition is itself a part of the
escalation process.
Summarizing, we have specified a number of objective cues that are
organizationally recognized by members of the court as justifying severe dis-
positions. The accumulation of these factors successively escalates the likeli-
hood that an adolescent will be consensually identified as "evil" and responded
to as such. Thus, prior court knowledge of the youth's activities, the prior
response to these activities by the court, the family situation of the youth,
and the social economic resources available to the family, all narrow the dis-
position possibilities of the presiding judge.44 It is our position that these
42 F. Tannenbuam, Crime and Community (New York: Columbia University Press,
1938) at 19.
43 J. Kelso, Can Slums be Abolished or Must We Continue to Pay the Penalty?
(Toronto: n. pub., n.d.) at 4-5.
44 A. Cicourel, The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (London: Heinemann,
1976) at 67.
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factors can be objectively identified, independent of the perception of the
individual judge, and that these factors collectively play an influential role
in determining juvenile court dispositions. Evidence in favour of these asser-
tions follows.
1. Sample
The sample of this research is taken from Youth Bureau records of the
Police Department for Metropolitan Toronto and the Juvenile and Family
Court records of the same city. Any juvenile offender who comes to the atten-
tion of the Youth Bureau has a "contact card" filed in the Office of Youth
Staff Services (approximately 330,000 cases are on file). When a juvenile is
sent to the Juvenile Court for legal adjudication, a personal folder is developed
containing all "contact cards" and all official record sheets upon which are
recorded the personal and official facts of each encounter the juvenile has
had with the police and the judiciary.
This folder, coded by the age of the child, is retained at all times by the
Youth Bureau. Copies of the delinquent's record are used in the actual court
cases when the Youth Bureau officer reads out the facts of the case to the
judge. These copies are fied in the juvenile's court record, which remains in
the record department under the child's name; they contain the official adjudi-
cation, disposition and relevant facts relating to the offence and the offender.
In the present research, the data concerning the offence, the offender, and
the disposition of the case were collected from files of the office of Youth
Staff Services. These facts then were checked with files from the Juvenile
Court's Record Department. This verification of Youth Bureau data was
necessary because the final disposition of the case was elaborated upon in the
Court files. Also, missing data from the Youth Bureau files was often available
in the Court files.
The sample of 301 cases randomly taken from the Toronto Youth
Bureau files involves juvenile offenders who appeared before a Juvenile Court
judge between 1968 and 1976. These files contain data on approximately
7,500 juvenile offenders who were sent to Juvenile Court at least once, and
often more than once, during this period. The cases sampled were chosen
using a random number table. The randomness of this sampling procedure
allows, with tests of statistical significance, probability statements from our
findings about the court population as a whole.
2. Data
The dependent variable for our analysis is the final disposition (Y,)
imposed by the presiding judge. The range of dispositions available for use
in the juvenile courts is rather extensive. Following the earlier research of
Edward Green, 45 we have ranked and coded this range of dispositions in terms
of the extent to which the freedom of the adolescent is restricted. These cod-
ings are reproduced in Table 1.
4 5S upra note 19.
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The six independent variables are also presented in Table 1 and were
selected on the basis of the legal-consensus, conflict-realist, and social organi-
zational frameworks discussed above. Thus, the first two independent vari-
ables, seriousness of present offence (X1) and number of prior convictions
(X.), are the two variables emphasized in research of the legal consensus
tradition. Offence seriousness was ranked and coded in terms of a four level
scale developed by Chilton and Markel, 46 and prior convictions were coded
as the actual number accumulated.
The third independent variable included in the analysis is socio-economic
status (X,), the variable of primary concern to the conflict-realist theorists.
Our interest in this variable was primarily as a neighbourhood measure, and it
was therefore coded in terms of the 1970 average male income level by census
tract in which the child lived when arrested for the latest offence. The median
annual income was $7,176; all offenders living in a census tract where the
median annual income was above this figure were placed in the higher socio-
economic category, and all offenders living in a census tract where the median
annual income was less than this figure were placed in the lower socio-eco-
nomic bracket.
The remaining independent variables considered in the analysis derive
from our discussion of the social organizational perspective. Thus, family
situation (X,) is measured in terms of the status of the home as "intact" or
"broken" by separation or divorce. Most serious prior disposition (X,) was
measured and coded with the scale discussed under final disposition above.
And age at first arrest was coded as the actual age involved.
Added to the six independent variables of theoretical interest was a set
of five control variables (X7 ,, )-age of first conviction, number of charges
at latest arrest, most serious prior offence, number of prior arrests, and seri-
ousness of offence committed at first conviction. These variables were thought
plausibly to influence disposition decisions and were therefore included and
statistically held constant as a means of eliminating the possibility of their
confounding the theoretical issues to be addressed.
3. The Analysis
The technique used in this study is multiple regression analysis-a gen-
eral statistical technique designed to examine the relationship between a de-
pendent variable, in this case final disposition, and a set of independent or
predictor variables. The multiple regression program produces correlation
coefficients (r), indicating the strength of association between pairs of vari-
ables; regression coefficients (B), indicating the relative influence of any
single independent variable on the dependent variable, with the remaining
variables statistically held constant; and cumulative measure of explained
variance in the dependent variable (R2). The independent and dependent
variables are measured in different units, and therefore the regression coeffi-
4 0 R. Chilton et al., Family Disruption, Delinquent Conduct and the Effect of Sub-
classification (1972), 37 Am. Soc. Rev. 93.
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cients in this analysis are standardized to facilitate interpretation.47 Finally,
tests of statistical significance are reported as a means of estimating the prob-
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4 7 In this analysis, use of metric and standard form coefficients yields similar sub-
stantive conclusions. However, the several theories examined assume that it is an of-
fender's legal and extra-legal attributes, relative to other offenders sentenced, that deter-
mine the relative severity of dispositions imposed. In deferrence to this assumption, we
have reported the standardized coefficients. On this point, see L. Hargens, A Note oil
Standardized Coefficients as Structural Parameters (1976), Soc. Methods & Research
247. For a more general discussion of the use of multiple regression techniques, see
H. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
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The results of our analysis are presented in Table II. Findings are first
reported for the full sample, indicating that all of our independent variables
are related to final disposition in the expected way. Thus, the more serious the
present offence (r = .08), the more prior convictions (r = .42), the lower
the socio-economic status (r = .17), the more disturbed the family situation
(r = .25), the more severe the prior disposition (r = .55), and the lower
the age at first arrest (r = -. 10), the more severe is the final disposition.
Among the independent variables, the severity of prior disposition appears
to be most important. This expectation is confirmed by the next column of
the Table, indicating the effect of each independent variable on final disposi-
tion with all other variables held constant. Severity of prior disposition retains
its apparent influence (B = .43), as do family situation (B = .10) and age
at first arrest (B = -. 08). The third column in this part of the Table reveals
that only these three variables have a statistically significant, independent in-
fluence on disposition. Combined, these three variables explain nearly a third
(R2 = .33) of the variation in types of sentences imposed. The reader will
note that this figure is more than three times the explained variance attribu-
table to objective characteristics in Hogarth's research. These findings alone
indicate that sentencing is a socially organized, as well as an individualized
process.
In the remaining parts of Table I, we investigate further the finding that
the adolescent's family situation significantly influences the disposition that
he or she receives. The hypothesis derived from the social organizational per-
spective proposed earlier in this paper was that socio-economic status would
exert its primary influence among those adolescents coming from broken
homes. To determine if this is indeed the case, the remainder of Table II
presents separate analyses for those cases involving "broken" and "intact"
homes.
Thus, the second part of Table II reveals that when the home is intact,
socio-economic status has no significant influence (B - .03, p>.05). Within
this sub-sample, it is again severity of prior disposition (B = .46) and age
at first arrest (B = -. 16) that are most influential. Both of these variables
exercise an influence that is statistically significant at the .05 level, with a
combined explained variance of .30.
However, the final part of Table II indicates an important change in this
pattern. Among those cases where the family's home is broken, socio-economic
status becomes a significant influence (3 = -. 14, p<.05). Beyond this, sever-
ity of prior disposition retains its effect (B = .42, p<.05), while number of
prior convictions (B - .19, p<.05) replaces age at first arrest (B = -. 09,
p>.05) as a secondary influence (cumulative R2 - .30). Although the latter
finding was not predicted in advance, our analysis is generally supportive of
the social organizational perspective outlined above.
E. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the behaviour of juvenile
law is socially organized. We have argued that decision-making in the juvenile
court is made predictable by a set of commonly recognized cues that signify
the moral and legal status of the adolescent. In particular, age of first arrest
1978]
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and severity of prior disposition are thought to be legal cues that signify and
escalate a judgment of "evil" that invokes severe dispositions. Beyond this,
there are social cues that encourage this response; namely, being from a
"broken family," particularly when that family is from a lower socio-economic
status neighbourhood. Combined, these factors are thought to lead to an "esca-
lation of evil" that ends in a punitive judicial response. Evidence gathered
in the Juvenile Court of the City of Toronto provide support for the viewpoint
we have outlined.
It is significant to recall how the perspective we have proposed differs
from competing approaches. The legal consensus approach assumes that court
decision-making proceeds almost exclusively on the basis of legal criteria.
Alternatively, the conflict-realist position argues as if such decisions are nearly
exclusively based on the extra-legal criteria of race and class.48 Finally, the
phenomenological approach suggests that neither legal nor extra-legal criteria
are of much significance, insisting instead that the way in which individual
judges perceive these factors will make the difference. We have not said that
any of these perspectives is necessarily false; our concern is that each of these
approaches overlooks the manner in which legal and extra-legal cues are
organized into a judgment of evil that evokes a severe judicial response. The
data we have analyzed indicates that this is done in a socially organized, as
contrasted with a totally individualized, manner.
There remains the issue as to whether the "escalation of evil" that char-
acterizes court operations can be justified in terms of juvenile court philosophy.
The answer to this question depends in part on the degree of faith that one
maintains in the rehabilitative capacity of court dispositions. If the rehabilita-
tive treatment associated with severe dispositions was willingly accepted and
effectively applied, one might approvingly conclude that ". . . lower class
kids .... from broken homes are more likely to receive free, the treatment
and rehabilitative services of the state. '49 The problem is that today the effec-
tiveness of rehabilitative treatment is not so readily assumed. Instead, "treat-
ment" is now more likely to be regarded as punishment.
48 An important exception to this statement is a recent presentation of the conflict
position by A. Turk, Law, Conflict and Order: From Theorizing Toward Theories (1976),
13 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anthrop. 282.
49 T. Hirschi, "Labelling Theory and Juvenile Delinquency: An Assessment of the
Evidence," in W. Gove, ed., The Labelling of Deviance: Evaluating a Perspective (New
York: Wiley, 1975).
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